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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Justin Lee Wilson appeals from his judgment of conviction for driving under the
influence, entered pursuant to his conditional guilty plea. On appeal, he challenges the
district court's orders denying his motion to exclude witnesses and his oral motion, on
the day of trial, for a continuance.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On June 28, 2012, police were dispatched in response to a citizen's report of a
person possibly driving under the influence.

(R., p.13.) The witnesses followed the

suspect to the Silver Fox Bar. (Id.) Police arrived shortly thereafter and, entering the
bar, asked the bartender who had entered just prior to them.

(Id.)

The bartender

indicated that Wilson was the most recent patron. (Id.)
The officer had Wilson exit the bar, but as the officer requested that Wilson stand
next to his vehicle, Wilson became uncooperative and attempted to reenter the bar. (R.,
pp.13-14.)

The officer handcuffed Wilson and forcefully escorted him back to the

officer's vehicle. (R., p.14.) A witness positively identified Wilson as the person who
had been driving under the influence. (Id.) Wilson refused to perform any standard field
sobriety tests, and officers arrested him for driving under the influence. (Id.) Officers
later transported Wilson to Kootenai Medical Center where a blood draw revealed that
Wilson had a BAC of 0.203. (R., pp.14-15; PSI, p.77.)
The state charged Wilson with felony driving under the influence (his third DUI
offense within the previous ten years). (R., pp.69-70.) Wilson pleaded not guilty and
the case was set for trial.

(R., p.75.)

Shortly before trial, Wilson filed a motion to
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exclude testimony from two witnesses, arguing that they had been disclosed late. (R.,
pp.140-41.) The district court denied that motion.

(R., p.152.)

On the day of trial,

Wilson made an oral motion for the court to reconsider its prior ruling on the witnesses
or to grant a continuance. (12/11/2012 Tr., p.4, Ls.14-20.) The district court modified
its order in regards to one of the witnesses, Ms. Oxner, allowing her to only testify in
rebuttal (Id., p.15, Ls.11-17), and denied the continuance (Id., p.18, Ls.13-16).
Wilson then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the
district court's denial of his motions. (R., pp.154, 156-67.) The district court entered
judgment against Wilson and sentenced him to a unified term of five years with two
years fixed, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.159-61.) Wilson filed a timely notice of
appeal. (R., pp.162-64.) Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court
suspended Wilson's sentence and placed him on probation for a period of three years.
(Judgment on Retained Jurisdiction (Augmentation).)
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ISSUES
Wilson states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court violate Mr. Wilson's rights to due process and
compulsory process when it denied Mr. Wilson's motion for a continuance
of the trial to allow additional time to interview the State's late-disclosed
witnesses and to disclose additional defense witnesses?
2.
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Wilson's
motion to exclude the State's late-disclosed witnesses?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Wilson failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying
his motion to exclude the rebuttal testimony of the bartender, Ms. Oxner?
2.
Has Wilson failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying
his oral motion, offered on the day of trial, for a continuance?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Wilson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying
His Motion To Exclude Rebuttal Witness Testimony

A.

Introduction
On September 24, 2012, the state submitted its first witness list, reserving the

right to supplement its discovery as the evidence became available. (Plaintiff's Witness
List (Augmentation).) At a pretrial conference on November 15, 2012, the district court
noted that the state had submitted its list of witnesses and asked Wilson to have his
submitted by 5:00 p.m. the following day. (11/15/2012 Tr., p.5, Ls.8-11.) On November
29, 2012, the state amended its witness list adding "Sheila Oxnerd, Silver Fox Bar."
(Amended - Plaintiff's Witness List (Augmentation).) The following day, the state filed a
second amended witness list, correcting the spelling of Ms. Oxner's name.

(Second

Amended - Plaintiff's Witness List (Augmentation).) Then, on December 10, 2012 (the
day before trial), the state amended its witness list a final time, relevant to this appeal,
by adding Ms. Oxner's phone number.

(Third Amended - Plaintiff's Witness List

(Augmentation).)
Prior to the state's third amendment, Wilson filed a motion to, inter alia, exclude
testimony from Ms. Oxner because she was disclosed after the discovery cut-off date.
(R., pp.140-41.) The district court agreed that Ms. Oxner was disclosed late, but denied
Wilson's motion. (12/10/2012 Tr., p.31, L.12-p.33, L.7; R., p.152.) The state engaged
in a diligent effort to locate and disclose Ms. Oxner to the defense. (12/10/2012 Tr.,
p.31, L.14 - p.32, L.16.)

However, though the district court would not exclude Ms.

Oxner, it required the state to make her available to the defense for interviewing, and
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restricted the state from calling her to testify until the defense had an opportunity to
interview her. (Id., p.32, L.17 - p.33, L.7.)
On the day of trial, Wilson asked the court to reconsider its ruling allowing Ms.
Oxner to testify. (12/11/2012 Tr., p.4, Ls.14-20.) Responding to the renewed motion,
the district court exercised its discretion and limited Ms. Oxner's testimony to rebuttal
only. (12/11/2012 Tr., p.15, Ls.11-17.) On appeal, Wilson asserts that the court abused
its discretion by not completely excluding Ms. Oxner from testifying. (Appellant's brief,
pp.10-16.)

Applying the correct legal standards to the facts of this case, however,

shows no abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Whether to impose a sanction for a discovery violation, and the choice of an

appropriate sanction, are within the discretion of the trial court." State v. Huntsman, 146
Idaho 580, 586, 199 P.3d 155, 162 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Allen, 145 Idaho 183,
185, 177 P.3d 397, 399 (Ct. App. 2008)). "[T]he trial court's exercise of that discretion is
beyond the purview of a reviewing court unless it has been clearly abused." State v.
Stradley, 127 Idaho 203, 208, 899 P.2d 416, 421 (1995) (citing State v. Buss, 98 Idaho
173, 174, 560 P.2d 495,496 (1977)).

C.

Because The District Court Limited Ms. Oxner's Testimony To Rebuttal Only,
The State's Failure To Timely Disclose Her Was Cured
Idaho Criminal Rule 16 governs discovery in criminal cases. Pursuant to Rule

16(a), a prosecutor is required to disclose to the defense all exculpatory evidence within
the prosecutor's possession or control. I.C.R. 16(a); see also State v. Lopez, 107 Idaho
726, 739, 692 P.2d 370, 383 (Ct. App. 1984) (prosecutor is constitutionally required to
5

disclose exculpatory evidence); State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 106, 685 P.2d 837, 847
(Ct. App. 1984) ("[T]he constitutional duty of disclosure and the requirement to disclose
under Rule 16(a) both relate to exculpatory evidence."). A prosecutor is also "required
by rule to disclose, upon request, the names and addresses of persons having
knowledge of the relevant facts."

Lopez, 107 Idaho at 739, 692 P.2d at 383 (citing

I.C.R. 16(b)(6)). But that duty to disclose witnesses does not extend "to persons called
for rebuttal." ]it (citing Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 685 P.2d 837); see also State v. Karpach,
146 Idaho 736, 739 n.2, 202 P.3d 1282, 1285 n.2 (Ct. App. 2009) (noting "general rule
that rebuttal witnesses need not be disclosed"); State v. Matthews, 108 Idaho 482, 486,
700 P.2d 104, 108 (Ct. App. 1985) ("There is no constitutional duty for the state to
disclose potentially inculpatory testimony of a rebuttal witness.").
The district court's ultimate ruling that limited Ms. Oxner to rebuttal testimony
cured any defect in the state's late disclosure of that witness. Because the state does
not have a duty to disclose rebuttal witnesses to the defense, it could no longer violate
the discovery rules by disclosing Ms. Oxner's identity and contact information after the
discovery cut-off date.

Wilson has failed to show that the district court abuse its

discretion by properly limiting Ms. Oxner to rebuttal testimony only.

D.

Wilson Has Also Failed To Show That The District Court's Ruling Rendered His
Trial Unfair
Wilson has also failed to show that allowing Ms. Oxner to testify only in rebuttal

unfairly prejudiced his defense. Whether to impose a sanction for a discovery violation,
and the choice of an appropriate sanction, are within the discretion of the trial court.
Allen, 145 Idaho at 185, 177 P.3d at 399. A party seeking the exclusion of evidence as
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a sanction for a discovery violation must establish prejudice.

Roe v. Doe, 129 Idaho

663, 668, 931 P.2d 657, 662 (Ct. App. 1996). "Where a late-disclosed witness has
been allowed to testify despite an untimely disclosure, [the appellate court] will not
reverse a conviction in the absence of a showing that the delay prejudiced the
defendant's preparation or presentation of his defense." Huntsman, 146 Idaho at 586,
199 P.3d at 161 (citing State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 592, 977 P.2d 203, 206
(1999); State v. Johnson, 132 Idaho 726, 728, 979 P.2d 128, 130 (Ct. App. 1999)). As
explained by the Court of Appeals:
The inquiry on appeal is whether the lateness of the disclosure so
prejudiced the defendant's preparation or presentation of his defense that
he was prevented from receiving his constitutionally guaranteed fair trial.
This ordinarily requires that the complaining party demonstrate that the
late disclosure hampered his ability to meet the evidence at trial, had a
deleterious effect on his trial strategy, or that it deprived him of the
opportunity to raise a valid challenge to the admissibility of evidence.
Huntsman, 146 Idaho at 587, 199 P.3d at 162 (internal citations omitted). Wilson insists
on appeal that his trial preparation was prejudiced by the late disclosure (Appellant's
brief, pp.10-15), but he has failed to show how it was prejudiced.
Because the district court limited Ms. Oxner to rebuttal testimony, the state's late
disclosure of the witness could not "hamper [Wilson's] ability to meet the evidence at
trial" or "ha[ve] a deleterious effect on his trial strategy." Wilson controlled whether or
not Ms. Oxner could present any evidence against him. "Rebuttal evidence is evidence
which explains, repels, counteracts, or disproves evidence which has been introduced
by or on behalf of the adverse party." State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 655, 873 P.2d 905,
909 (Ct. App. 1994) (citation omitted). In the context of a criminal case, it is "evidence
offered by the prosecution to contradict the evidence in the defendant's case-in-chief."
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Karpach, 146 Idaho 736, 739 n.2, 202 P.3d 1282, 1285 n.2 (citing Lopez, 107 Idaho at
739, 692 P.2d at 383). If Wilson did not present a case-in-chief, Ms. Oxner would have
nothing to rebut and so would be excluded from testifying.
And not presenting a case-in-chief was, in fact, Wilson's trial strategy: When
asked what would have precluded the state from calling Ms. Oxner as a rebuttal witness
without disclosing her, defense counsel acknowledged that the state could do that, "but
she wouldn't have been able to be called as a rebuttal evidence [sic] if I didn't present
any evidence for her to rebut." (12/11/2012 Tr., p.11, Ls.17-25.) Defense counsel then
explained that, "[p]rior to Ms. Oxner's testimony, I had not planned on my client
testifying or presenting any witnesses and there would have been nothing for her to
present in rebuttal." (Id., p.11, L.25 - p.12, L.3.) Allowing Ms. Oxner to testify as a
rebuttal witness could not have been detrimental to Wilson's trial strategy because, if he
had followed that strategy, there would have been no rebuttal and Ms. Oxner would
have never been able to testify.
The district court's sanction of the state for its discovery violation, limiting Ms.
Oxner to rebuttal testimony, cured any violation from the state. Moreover, Wilson has
failed to show that the late disclosure of Ms. Oxner, where she was limited to testifying
in rebuttal, in any way prejudiced his defense. Wilson has failed to show that the district
court abused its discretion by limiting Ms. Oxner to rebuttal testimony. The district court
should be affirmed.
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11.
Wilson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying
His Oral Motion, Offered On The Day Of Trial, For A Continuance
A.

Introduction
As an alternative to his motion to prohibit the state from presenting the testimony

of Ms. Oxner, Wilson requested a continuance. (12/10/2012 Tr., p.4, Ls.14-20.) After
limiting Ms. Oxner to a rebuttal witness, the district court denied Wilson's motion for a
continuance. (Id., p.18, Ls.13-16.) Wilson claims on appeal that the district court erred
by not granting his continuance. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-10.) Wilson has failed to show
that the district court abused its discretion, however, because he has failed to establish
that his substantial rights were prejudiced as a result of the denial of his motion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to grant a continuance rests within the discretion of the trial

judge. State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 255, 899 P.2d 959, 965 (1995); State v. Averett,
142 Idaho 879, 889, 136 P.3d 350, 360 (Ct. App. 2006). "Unless an appellant shows
that his substantial rights have been prejudiced by reason of a denial of his motion for
continuance, appellate courts can only conclude that there was no abuse of discretion."

kl (citing State v.
C.

Cagle, 126 Idaho 794, 797, 891 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Ct. App. 1995)).

The District Court Properly Denied Wilson's Motion For A Continuance
"[W]here the denial of a motion to continue is attacked on the basis of late

disclosure or discovery of evidence, the alleged tardiness of the disclosure must be
shown to so prejudice the defendant's case preparation that a fair trial was denied."
Tapia, 127 Idaho at 255, 899 P.2d at 965 (citing State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 770,
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710 P.2d 1202, 1206 (1985); State v. Smoot, 99 Idaho 855, 858-59, 590 P.2d 1001,
1004-05 (1978)). "To prove prejudice, a defendant must show there is a reasonable
probability that, but for the late-disclosure of evidence, the result of the proceedings
would have been different."

!st (citing State v. Spradlin, 119 Idaho 1030, 1034, 812

P.2d 744, 748 (Ct. App. 1991)).
Just as he failed to demonstrate prejudice in relation to the denial of his motion to
exclude the testimony of Ms. Oxner, Wilson has failed to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by the denial of his motion for a continuance. First, his case did not actually
go to trial, so he cannot show that he received an unfair trial. Second, as noted above,
even his intended trial strategy was unaffected by the district court giving permission for
Ms. Oxner to testify as a rebuttal witness only. Below and on appeal, Wilson claims he
needed a continuance to locate "witnesses to counter [Ms. Oxner's] expected
testimony." (See Appellant's brief, p.6; 12/11/2012 Tr., p.6, L.12 - p.7, L.5.) But had
Wilson followed his trial strategy, he would have effectively excluded Ms. Oxner from
testifying, and there would have been no testimony to counter.
On appeal, Wilson further asserts that he was prejudiced by the denial of a
/'

continuance and that the state would not have been prejudiced by the granting of the
continuance.

(Appellant's brief, pp.8-10.)

Wilson is wrong on both counts.

At the

hearing on his motion, defense counsel acknowledged that "[s]ince the beginning of this
case Mr. Wilson's and l's [sic] theory of the case was that he had drank [sic] in the bar."
(12/11/2012 Tr., p.6, Ls.12-14.) As that was always his defense, Wilson had ample time
to prepare it. Defense counsel's real difficulty in locating witnesses for Wilson was that
Wilson had only provided sufficient information for one witness, and that witness would
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not return defense counsel's calls. (12/4/2012 Tr., p.7, L.16 - p.8, L.1.) The court is not
required to give the defense unlimited time to marshal evidence in support of its theory
of the case. That Wilson failed to gather any evidence in support of his theory of the
case before trial does not show prejudice.
Unlike Wilson, the state would have been prejudiced if the district court granted
Wilson's continuance. The parties anticipated that the trial would last for three days. A
key witness for the state, Ms. Mayfield, who saw Wilson, intoxicated, climb into his
vehicle and drive (R., p.20), was in the legal custody of the Idaho Department of
Correction. On December 5, 2012, she was sentenced in an unrelated case to a period
of retained jurisdiction. (R., p.136.) Rather than transport her immediately, the district
court ordered that she be retained in the custody of the Kootenai County Sheriff's
Department until December 14, 2012, to make her available for trial. (R., p.138.) Had
the continuance been granted and Ms. Mayfield been transferred, she may have not
been available to testify at trial or, at least, it would have been difficult to arrange for her
testimony at trial.
Ultimately Wilson's argument to the district court amounted to nothing more than
a claim that he would have liked more time to gather evidence and witnesses for a case
that, according to counsel, he did not intend to present. (See 12/11/2012 Tr., p.11, L.25
- p.12, L.3.)

To prevail on his motion for a continuance, Wilson had the burden of

demonstrating that he would be prejudiced in the presentation of his case. He cannot
meet that burden by merely claiming that he wished to conduct additional investigation.
But that was the only claim he made to the district court. Because he failed to show
actual prejudice at trial from the denial of his request for a continuance, or even
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prejudice to his trial preparation, he has failed to show that the district court abused its
discretion or violated his due process rights.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's orders
denying Wilson's motion to exclude rebuttal witness testimony and denying his motion
for a continuance.

DATED this 24th day of February, 2015.
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Deputy Attorney General
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SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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